As President Dmitri Medvedev formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a televised announcement, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn must have been rolling over in his grave and thinking, “I told you so.” Solzhenitsyn, who passed away earlier this year, had always argued that Russia had a strong soul that needed to be tamed or it would cause trouble.

The Kremlin seems to have decided to go with trouble, at least for the moment. The recognition decision comes a day after U.S. President George Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel explicitly warned Russia not to extend formal recognition to the republics, according to Stratfor, a U.S. company offering on-line intelligence. Furthermore, the Kremlin is hammering home the point - to Western governments - that it disdains their condemnations as insignificant. Meanwhile Russia is consolidating its footholds in Georgia and conceivably its spheres of influence in its “near-abroad” of countries formerly in Moscow’s orbit.

The west promptly denounced the Russian decision. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called the decision “totally unacceptable” and UK foreign minister David Milliband stated that “Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity cannot be changed by decree from Moscow.” In this situation, such strong rhetoric will need to be backed up by effective support for Georgia as well as with a new stance toward Moscow. Otherwise western bravado can backfire in the face of determined Russian action.

Russia will continue to use parallels to the Kosovo ‘precedent’ to contradict immediate or delayed reactions from Western leaders. The West will continue to say Kosovo was a ‘unique’ case and all other avenues had been exhausted. The rest of the states in the Caucasus will be watching closely-in the next few weeks for further developments in this conflict. Russia has made an audacious move, and the west is on the defensive. But Moscow must be wary of unleashing a backlash with secessionist regions, such as Chechnya, already on edge.

Georgia will desperately need the help of its Western allies if it is to assert its independence, but it may find the pressure from a muscle-flexing Russia and an indecisive West so unbearable that the nation loses its viability. In the longer run, Russia may have gone too far by using its military force when the lack of real dialogue frustrated Moscow. The danger is less that the attack will goad the west into countervailing action and more that the Russians may have edged themselves closer toward one of their chronic weaknesses: isolation.

The Russian Duma’s resolution calling for recognition of the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is non-binding, so President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have the option of ignoring it. Indeed, they may not wish to stop short of a step liable to stir up secessionist fever in Chechnya and other restive regions within Russia’s own borders.

But Russia will certainly play the “recognition card” in negotiations about the outcome and future shape of Georgia. For one thing, Russia wants to pay back the West in its own coin for recognizing Kosovo’s independence in defiance of Moscow.

Each of the two regions has also expressed the wish to join Russia officially if they gain independence. This would expand Russian territory deep into Georgia. In practice, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are already independent, but Georgia depends on each region for key transportation infrastructure — such as the port of Sukhumi in Abkhazia for imports.

Europe is highly concerned that Russia could recognize secessionist regions in Georgia and in other nearby countries, according to Stratfor, a U.S. company offering on-line intelligence analysis. When Europe recognized Kosovo, it had control of the security situation there. In contrast, “there are countless other secessionist regions - Transdniestria in Moldova, for example - that were already stirring because of Kosovo’s independence and could really light up if they see Russia as a new guarantor of independence,” Stratfor reported.

In Russia itself, formal recognition of the breakaway republics on the ground of self-determination could create a dangerous domino effect within Russian borders. Russia has more than a dozen secessionist regions, many of which are powerful and organized. Moreover, some of these regions could attract strong foreign support - a situation the West could use to destabilize Russia or get Moscow involved in another set of wars within its own territory.

The Kremlin has worked very hard in the past few years to clamp down on the most volatile places, like Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, but there is always the possibility that these regions could flare up again very quickly.

Moscow’s use of military force against neighboring Georgia is bound to be a major setback for the West in its “pipeline war” with Russia in which the US and the EU are trying to devise ways of getting oil and gas directly to European markets without going through Russia.

Much of these Western hopes center on the territory of Georgia as a passageway from Central Asia to Turkey and its European neighbors.

Now it will be much harder to convince investors that these new pipelines are safe long-term bets for their money, according to Georgia Falls Victim to Pipeline Politics by a Platt’s specialist writing for the BBC.

This U.S. plan was described in European Affairs by its top US architect, Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza in a recent issue.

The escalation of Russian pressure on Georgia, since the West supported Kosovo’s declaration of independence, has been charted in our European Affairs blog.

As noted here before, Georgia and its allies (including the United States and most EU member states) have feared that Russia might be “paving the way” for official recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia, the Georgian provinces with separatist ambitions. Following the West’s recognition of Kosovo, which Russia opposed, Moscow warned that the move could cause further provincial splits in the porous Caucasus region, and some Europeans feared that the warning might become a self-fulfilling prophecy– especially with help from Moscow. With each passing week, there are fresh signs that the concern may have been well-founded as, according to reports today, Russia now says it intends to upgrade ties with the two separatist territories in neighboring Georgia.

The Georgian government in Tbilisi attacked the plan as “creeping annexation” aimed at creating problems liable to complicate Georgia’s acceptance into NATO. From today’s Wall Street Journal:

Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgian control in fighting during the early 1990s. They are protected by Russian peacekeepers, use Russian rubles, and Russian passports have been issued in recent years to a majority of the population.

Wednesday’s statement said Russia’s goal was to improve the economies of the two territories, and not to provoke confrontation with Tbilisi. It also stopped short of formally recognizing the territories’ bids for independence, though leaders in the territories and Russia’s parliament welcomed the move as a step toward recognition.

“The State Duma passed an appeal proposing the president consider the possible recognition of Abkhazia and North Ossetia. The president has taken the first step in this direction,” Oleg Morozov, first deputy speaker of Russia’s parliament said Wednesday, Russian news agency Interfax reported.

Despite strong support from the U.S. and several European nations, Georgia’s bid for NATO membership was thwarted earlier this month when Germany, France and some other European members balked at U.S. pressure and refused to agree that conditions were ripe to offer Georgia (and Ukraine, which also borders Russia) a Membership Action Plan, which is the preliminary step to a candidacy for membership in the alliance. Any NATO steps toward admitting Georgia or other eastward expansion by NATO were stiffly opposed by outgoing Russian President Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev.

RadioFree Europe also has an extensive account of the latest developments:

Determined to thwart Tbilisi’s goals of reintegration, [Russia] remains a steadfast supporter of the breakaway regime and maintains considerable leverage as the dominant player in international mediation efforts.

In recent weeks, Moscow has actively stepped up its presence in the breakaway regions, lifting economic sanctions and moving to establish semi-official “embassies.” Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 16 ordered his government to recognize legal entities registered in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Moscow, mindful of its own separatist conflicts, is likely to stop short of recognizing Tskhinvali and Sukhumi’s self-declared independence. But such moves are still deeply aggravating to Tbilisi, and ensure that Russia will continue to play a decisive role in the region.

Related Posts:
NATO Approves U.S. Missile Agenda as Allies Postpone Georgia and Ukraine, 3 April 2008
European Officials Fear Russian Meddling in Georgian Separatist Region of Abkhazia, 11 March 2008
Medvedev Steps Up Rhetoric, Warns Against NATO Expansion Eastward, 25 March 2008

See Also:
Georgia: Could More Dialogue, Fewer Demands, Be Ticket On Abkhazia? [RadioFree Europe, 16 April 2008]
Russia to Bolster Ties to Separatist Areas in Georgia [Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2008]

European foreign ministries feel “preoccupation and anxiety” over the possibility that Russia is preparing to extend official recognition to Abkhazia, the breakaway province of Georgia, the European Commission’s top official for external relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner said this week. Her comment was published Monday by the EU Observer, an on-line news service, as EU foreign ministers gathered for a meeting in Slovenia, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency.

Her sense of alarm echoed calls by Sweden and Poland for the EU to take a stronger stance in support of Georgia in the wake of Moscow’s action last Thursday in opening free trade with the territory. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner stressed European support for Georgia and cited spreading alarm in Europe that “Russia may be paving the way for recognition of Abkhazia.” This territory on the Black Sea has set up its own government and is protected by Russian peacekeepers, but it has not been recognized by anyone.

Moscow, in improving ties with Abkhazia, seems to be intent on fulfilling its own dire warning that Western-backed independence for Kosovo last month could create a precedent for further “Balkanizing” splits in the Caucasus. Moscow has not cited Kosovo in its statements about Abkhazia, but Slovenia’s foreign minister, Dimitrij Rupel, who chaired the EU meeting, was quoted saying that “Russia and [the rest of] the Confederation of Independent States have decided to draw certain parallels with Kosovo.”

Officials in Georgia lashed out at Russia’s attitude. The speaker of the country’s parliament, Nino Burjanadze, called Russia’s recent actions “really bad news” for Georgia. He predicted that the Russians’ abandoning the international embargo on direct trade with Abkhazia “means that they are going, step by step, in the direction of the annexation of this territory.”

Related Posts:
Kosovo’s Independence Boosts Copycat Separatists in Georgia, 7 March 2008
Kosovo: A Real Geopolitical Precedent, 14 February 2008

See Also:
EU foreign ministers concerned Russia to recognize Abkhazia (EU Observer, 11 March 2008)

The clashing views of Moscow and Washington about the future of Kosovo were laid out powerfully and clearly in a recent semi-public exchange between two well-placed individuals on opposite sides of the argument. Dimitri K. Simes, a scholar specialized in the affairs of his native Russia, who now heads the Nixon Center in Washington. Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, the U.S. special representative to the talks on Kosovo’s future headed by United Nations envoy, Martti Ahtissari.

Their dialogue of articles and letters was circulated by the Committee for the Republic, an informal circle of policy intellectuals in Washington. One of the circle’s members is former U.S. Ambassador Chas Freeman to whom some of the correspondence was addressed. European Affairs found it a clarifying account of the fundamental arguments on both sides. (more…)