As President Dmitri Medvedev formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a televised announcement, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn must have been rolling over in his grave and thinking, “I told you so.” Solzhenitsyn, who passed away earlier this year, had always argued that Russia had a strong soul that needed to be tamed or it would cause trouble.

The Kremlin seems to have decided to go with trouble, at least for the moment. The recognition decision comes a day after U.S. President George Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel explicitly warned Russia not to extend formal recognition to the republics, according to Stratfor, a U.S. company offering on-line intelligence. Furthermore, the Kremlin is hammering home the point - to Western governments - that it disdains their condemnations as insignificant. Meanwhile Russia is consolidating its footholds in Georgia and conceivably its spheres of influence in its “near-abroad” of countries formerly in Moscow’s orbit.

The west promptly denounced the Russian decision. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called the decision “totally unacceptable” and UK foreign minister David Milliband stated that “Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity cannot be changed by decree from Moscow.” In this situation, such strong rhetoric will need to be backed up by effective support for Georgia as well as with a new stance toward Moscow. Otherwise western bravado can backfire in the face of determined Russian action.

Russia will continue to use parallels to the Kosovo ‘precedent’ to contradict immediate or delayed reactions from Western leaders. The West will continue to say Kosovo was a ‘unique’ case and all other avenues had been exhausted. The rest of the states in the Caucasus will be watching closely-in the next few weeks for further developments in this conflict. Russia has made an audacious move, and the west is on the defensive. But Moscow must be wary of unleashing a backlash with secessionist regions, such as Chechnya, already on edge.

Georgia will desperately need the help of its Western allies if it is to assert its independence, but it may find the pressure from a muscle-flexing Russia and an indecisive West so unbearable that the nation loses its viability. In the longer run, Russia may have gone too far by using its military force when the lack of real dialogue frustrated Moscow. The danger is less that the attack will goad the west into countervailing action and more that the Russians may have edged themselves closer toward one of their chronic weaknesses: isolation.

As noted here before, Georgia and its allies (including the United States and most EU member states) have feared that Russia might be “paving the way” for official recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia, the Georgian provinces with separatist ambitions. Following the West’s recognition of Kosovo, which Russia opposed, Moscow warned that the move could cause further provincial splits in the porous Caucasus region, and some Europeans feared that the warning might become a self-fulfilling prophecy– especially with help from Moscow. With each passing week, there are fresh signs that the concern may have been well-founded as, according to reports today, Russia now says it intends to upgrade ties with the two separatist territories in neighboring Georgia.

The Georgian government in Tbilisi attacked the plan as “creeping annexation” aimed at creating problems liable to complicate Georgia’s acceptance into NATO. From today’s Wall Street Journal:

Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgian control in fighting during the early 1990s. They are protected by Russian peacekeepers, use Russian rubles, and Russian passports have been issued in recent years to a majority of the population.

Wednesday’s statement said Russia’s goal was to improve the economies of the two territories, and not to provoke confrontation with Tbilisi. It also stopped short of formally recognizing the territories’ bids for independence, though leaders in the territories and Russia’s parliament welcomed the move as a step toward recognition.

“The State Duma passed an appeal proposing the president consider the possible recognition of Abkhazia and North Ossetia. The president has taken the first step in this direction,” Oleg Morozov, first deputy speaker of Russia’s parliament said Wednesday, Russian news agency Interfax reported.

Despite strong support from the U.S. and several European nations, Georgia’s bid for NATO membership was thwarted earlier this month when Germany, France and some other European members balked at U.S. pressure and refused to agree that conditions were ripe to offer Georgia (and Ukraine, which also borders Russia) a Membership Action Plan, which is the preliminary step to a candidacy for membership in the alliance. Any NATO steps toward admitting Georgia or other eastward expansion by NATO were stiffly opposed by outgoing Russian President Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev.

RadioFree Europe also has an extensive account of the latest developments:

Determined to thwart Tbilisi’s goals of reintegration, [Russia] remains a steadfast supporter of the breakaway regime and maintains considerable leverage as the dominant player in international mediation efforts.

In recent weeks, Moscow has actively stepped up its presence in the breakaway regions, lifting economic sanctions and moving to establish semi-official “embassies.” Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 16 ordered his government to recognize legal entities registered in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Moscow, mindful of its own separatist conflicts, is likely to stop short of recognizing Tskhinvali and Sukhumi’s self-declared independence. But such moves are still deeply aggravating to Tbilisi, and ensure that Russia will continue to play a decisive role in the region.

Related Posts:
NATO Approves U.S. Missile Agenda as Allies Postpone Georgia and Ukraine, 3 April 2008
European Officials Fear Russian Meddling in Georgian Separatist Region of Abkhazia, 11 March 2008
Medvedev Steps Up Rhetoric, Warns Against NATO Expansion Eastward, 25 March 2008

See Also:
Georgia: Could More Dialogue, Fewer Demands, Be Ticket On Abkhazia? [RadioFree Europe, 16 April 2008]
Russia to Bolster Ties to Separatist Areas in Georgia [Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2008]

The Bush administration pushed ahead this week in its face-off with Russia over independence for Kosovo - and Russia pushed back in the Caucasus.

Since warning that recognition of Kosovars’ demands could trigger similar separatist ambitions in Abkhasia and elsewhere in Georgia, Moscow has announced plans to move more Russian “peacekeepers” into the breakaway province of Georgia - a step that alarmed Georgian leaders as a possible step toward full recognition threatening to partially dismember Georgia.

President Mikhail Saakashvili of the Republic of Georgia was on an official visit to Washington, where he obtained President George W. Bush’s backing for NATO, at its forthcoming summit, to offer to open a negotiating process that could ultimately bring Georgia into the Western alliance. Bush also announced that he was approving Kosovo as a candidate to receive U.S. military assistance.

This escalation between Washington and Moscow marks the outbreak of a new Cold War, according to Stratfor, an on-line geopolitical think-tank. Of course, the United States outweighs Russia and it is geographically remote from the theater of conflict. That leaves the Europeans in the front line. For the moment, they are trying to keep out of the way, but they will end up having to play major roles as independent actors in this new Cold War, Stratfor’s analyst said.

The current diplomatic inertness in the European Union can be seen in the three main governments: Germany, France and the United Kingdom are not interested in confronting Russia.

“Berlin made this very clear when it expressed a lack of interest in NATO expansion, the independence of Kosovo and the Ukraine gas issue. This is not surprising, given that the Germans are dependent upon Moscow for energy. Beyond energy, Germany’s wider economic relationship with and its proximity to Russia inform its lack of appetite for confrontation with the Kremlin,” Stratfor said.

France has its international ambitions targeted elsewhere, mainly in re-asserting its stature in Europe and emerging as a more credible player in the Middle East. “It wants no part of this new West-versus-Russia competition,” Stratfor says. Britain is preoccupied domestically.

But this will change, Stratfor predicts. Germany is re-emerging on its own again as an international power player; Britain ultimately cannot detach itself from any major U.S. geopolitical commitment; and France will ultimately find it untenable to ignore this clash. “Europe’s geography - and the fact that, unlike during the original Cold War, there isn’t an iron curtain in place - will force the Europeans to jump in or at least choose sides.”

Related Article: “The Start of Cold War II?” Stratfor’s Political Diary, 21 March 2008

European foreign ministries feel “preoccupation and anxiety” over the possibility that Russia is preparing to extend official recognition to Abkhazia, the breakaway province of Georgia, the European Commission’s top official for external relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner said this week. Her comment was published Monday by the EU Observer, an on-line news service, as EU foreign ministers gathered for a meeting in Slovenia, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency.

Her sense of alarm echoed calls by Sweden and Poland for the EU to take a stronger stance in support of Georgia in the wake of Moscow’s action last Thursday in opening free trade with the territory. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner stressed European support for Georgia and cited spreading alarm in Europe that “Russia may be paving the way for recognition of Abkhazia.” This territory on the Black Sea has set up its own government and is protected by Russian peacekeepers, but it has not been recognized by anyone.

Moscow, in improving ties with Abkhazia, seems to be intent on fulfilling its own dire warning that Western-backed independence for Kosovo last month could create a precedent for further “Balkanizing” splits in the Caucasus. Moscow has not cited Kosovo in its statements about Abkhazia, but Slovenia’s foreign minister, Dimitrij Rupel, who chaired the EU meeting, was quoted saying that “Russia and [the rest of] the Confederation of Independent States have decided to draw certain parallels with Kosovo.”

Officials in Georgia lashed out at Russia’s attitude. The speaker of the country’s parliament, Nino Burjanadze, called Russia’s recent actions “really bad news” for Georgia. He predicted that the Russians’ abandoning the international embargo on direct trade with Abkhazia “means that they are going, step by step, in the direction of the annexation of this territory.”

Related Posts:
Kosovo’s Independence Boosts Copycat Separatists in Georgia, 7 March 2008
Kosovo: A Real Geopolitical Precedent, 14 February 2008

See Also:
EU foreign ministers concerned Russia to recognize Abkhazia (EU Observer, 11 March 2008)

Separatist ambitions in the Caucasus region have received their first tangible boost from the example of Kosovo’s independence. The breakaway Abkhazia region in Georgia appealed to international bodies for recognition of its independence in messages sent March 7, the day after Russia announced that it was lifting its trade restrictions on the territory.

The move came two days after a similar move by South Ossetia, another region of Georgia that is in revolt against the central government in Tbilisi. In their appeal, the political leaders of South Ossetia, also heavily pro-Russian, said that “the Kosovo precedent presents a convincing argument” for recognition of the province’s independent because – as with Kosovo in Serbia – “co-existence” had become demonstrably impossible with Georgia. The friction between Georgia and Russia is aggravated, too, by the former’s efforts to join the NATO alliance.

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By David Young

At the time of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the premise of Western governments was that confronting ethnic cleansing was more important than respecting the international borders. The message was that would-be tyrants in future needed to know – and be deterred by – the cost that would be imposed on them by the international community if they sought to inflict such atrocities. The U.S. decision to throw its full political-military weight into Kosovo reflected eagerness to make up for perceived moral failures in the 1990s (notably Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia). President Bill Clinton was eager to restore America’s image as the global policeman backing up the recently proclaimed new world order. And he wanted to restore the strategic authority of the United States.

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By Francois Clemenceau

At last there is a book- authoritative but not yet translated into English- that answers the tormenting question of why the two most wanted mass murderers of the Yugoslav civil wars have never been brought to justice a decade after international warrants were issued for them. Despite repeated reports of their imminent arrests, the pair – Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who headed the Bosnian Serbs’ army – have managed to elude capture and extradition to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.

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The clashing views of Moscow and Washington about the future of Kosovo were laid out powerfully and clearly in a recent semi-public exchange between two well-placed individuals on opposite sides of the argument. Dimitri K. Simes, a scholar specialized in the affairs of his native Russia, who now heads the Nixon Center in Washington. Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, the U.S. special representative to the talks on Kosovo’s future headed by United Nations envoy, Martti Ahtissari.

Their dialogue of articles and letters was circulated by the Committee for the Republic, an informal circle of policy intellectuals in Washington. One of the circle’s members is former U.S. Ambassador Chas Freeman to whom some of the correspondence was addressed. European Affairs found it a clarifying account of the fundamental arguments on both sides. (more…)