As President Dmitri Medvedev formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a televised announcement, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn must have been rolling over in his grave and thinking, “I told you so.” Solzhenitsyn, who passed away earlier this year, had always argued that Russia had a strong soul that needed to be tamed or it would cause trouble.

The Kremlin seems to have decided to go with trouble, at least for the moment. The recognition decision comes a day after U.S. President George Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel explicitly warned Russia not to extend formal recognition to the republics, according to Stratfor, a U.S. company offering on-line intelligence. Furthermore, the Kremlin is hammering home the point - to Western governments - that it disdains their condemnations as insignificant. Meanwhile Russia is consolidating its footholds in Georgia and conceivably its spheres of influence in its “near-abroad” of countries formerly in Moscow’s orbit.

The west promptly denounced the Russian decision. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called the decision “totally unacceptable” and UK foreign minister David Milliband stated that “Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity cannot be changed by decree from Moscow.” In this situation, such strong rhetoric will need to be backed up by effective support for Georgia as well as with a new stance toward Moscow. Otherwise western bravado can backfire in the face of determined Russian action.

Russia will continue to use parallels to the Kosovo ‘precedent’ to contradict immediate or delayed reactions from Western leaders. The West will continue to say Kosovo was a ‘unique’ case and all other avenues had been exhausted. The rest of the states in the Caucasus will be watching closely-in the next few weeks for further developments in this conflict. Russia has made an audacious move, and the west is on the defensive. But Moscow must be wary of unleashing a backlash with secessionist regions, such as Chechnya, already on edge.

Georgia will desperately need the help of its Western allies if it is to assert its independence, but it may find the pressure from a muscle-flexing Russia and an indecisive West so unbearable that the nation loses its viability. In the longer run, Russia may have gone too far by using its military force when the lack of real dialogue frustrated Moscow. The danger is less that the attack will goad the west into countervailing action and more that the Russians may have edged themselves closer toward one of their chronic weaknesses: isolation.