Russia is stepping up its campaign to impose a moral equivalence between its military action against Georgia over South Ossetia last summer and NATO’s intervention against Serbia over Kosovo in 1998-1999. The Kremlin line consists of justifying Moscow’s actions by claiming that it is implementing the resolution of the U.N. Security Council imposing a “responsibility to protect” civilian populations from genocidal threats, even from their own legitimate government. That resolution was passed in response to events in Rwanda, but it has never been implemented by major U.N. member states.

Calling the comparison a “red herring,” that is being fabricated by Russia, Jamie Rubin, former U.S. assistant secretary of state under the Clinton administration, writes in the current issue of The New Republic that the international community’s action in Kosovo was “all about moral intervention” whereas Russia’s action in Georgia is “all about geopolitical resentment.”

Rubin points out that condemnation for Serbia’s crimes against Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority began with “unanimity among the major powers – the United States, key European governments, and, yes, even Russia.” Moscow supported economic sanctions against Serbia, and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanovo even admitted to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that the “threat of force might be necessary.”

So what has happened that made Russia change its tune? For one, the Bush administration strained relations with Moscow in 2003, by defying Russia’s objections to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Rubin says that then-president Putin is a temperamental leader who took this affront personally. (After all, he notes, Putin had supported U.S. actions in Afghanistan, the scene of past Soviet humiliation.) So Putin viewed it as adding insult to injury when the U.S. and the EU moved to recognize Kosovo’s independence – against Moscow’s objections.

Creating false moral equivalences is no new tactic for Russia. Back in August during the Russian invasion of Georgia, European Affairs predicted the Kremlin’s tactics, saying that “Russia will certainly play the recognition card in negotiations about the outcome and future shape of Georgia” and explaining that “Russia wants to pay back the West in its own coin for recognizing Kosovo’s independence in defiance of Moscow.”

Now, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev argues that “there is certainly no serious argument which would allow one to … separate the process of recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from decisions taken with regard to Kosovo.”

The idea that Russia is claiming to be the guardian of human rights will not convince many people, but Russia’s attempt to create a parallel between Georgia and Serbia – the two countries that have lost provinces after outside nations intervened in the interest of local civilian populations – irritates U.S. and European officials. Rubin calls Russia’s analogy “nonsense” and says that this flawed logic will draw Russia into a corner – aggravating what the European Affairs blog called “one of [Russia’s] chronic weaknesses: isolation.”

As President Dmitri Medvedev formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a televised announcement, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn must have been rolling over in his grave and thinking, “I told you so.” Solzhenitsyn, who passed away earlier this year, had always argued that Russia had a strong soul that needed to be tamed or it would cause trouble.

The Kremlin seems to have decided to go with trouble, at least for the moment. The recognition decision comes a day after U.S. President George Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel explicitly warned Russia not to extend formal recognition to the republics, according to Stratfor, a U.S. company offering on-line intelligence. Furthermore, the Kremlin is hammering home the point - to Western governments - that it disdains their condemnations as insignificant. Meanwhile Russia is consolidating its footholds in Georgia and conceivably its spheres of influence in its “near-abroad” of countries formerly in Moscow’s orbit.

The west promptly denounced the Russian decision. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called the decision “totally unacceptable” and UK foreign minister David Milliband stated that “Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity cannot be changed by decree from Moscow.” In this situation, such strong rhetoric will need to be backed up by effective support for Georgia as well as with a new stance toward Moscow. Otherwise western bravado can backfire in the face of determined Russian action.

Russia will continue to use parallels to the Kosovo ‘precedent’ to contradict immediate or delayed reactions from Western leaders. The West will continue to say Kosovo was a ‘unique’ case and all other avenues had been exhausted. The rest of the states in the Caucasus will be watching closely-in the next few weeks for further developments in this conflict. Russia has made an audacious move, and the west is on the defensive. But Moscow must be wary of unleashing a backlash with secessionist regions, such as Chechnya, already on edge.

Georgia will desperately need the help of its Western allies if it is to assert its independence, but it may find the pressure from a muscle-flexing Russia and an indecisive West so unbearable that the nation loses its viability. In the longer run, Russia may have gone too far by using its military force when the lack of real dialogue frustrated Moscow. The danger is less that the attack will goad the west into countervailing action and more that the Russians may have edged themselves closer toward one of their chronic weaknesses: isolation.

The Russian Duma’s resolution calling for recognition of the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is non-binding, so President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have the option of ignoring it. Indeed, they may not wish to stop short of a step liable to stir up secessionist fever in Chechnya and other restive regions within Russia’s own borders.

But Russia will certainly play the “recognition card” in negotiations about the outcome and future shape of Georgia. For one thing, Russia wants to pay back the West in its own coin for recognizing Kosovo’s independence in defiance of Moscow.

Each of the two regions has also expressed the wish to join Russia officially if they gain independence. This would expand Russian territory deep into Georgia. In practice, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are already independent, but Georgia depends on each region for key transportation infrastructure — such as the port of Sukhumi in Abkhazia for imports.

Europe is highly concerned that Russia could recognize secessionist regions in Georgia and in other nearby countries, according to Stratfor, a U.S. company offering on-line intelligence analysis. When Europe recognized Kosovo, it had control of the security situation there. In contrast, “there are countless other secessionist regions - Transdniestria in Moldova, for example - that were already stirring because of Kosovo’s independence and could really light up if they see Russia as a new guarantor of independence,” Stratfor reported.

In Russia itself, formal recognition of the breakaway republics on the ground of self-determination could create a dangerous domino effect within Russian borders. Russia has more than a dozen secessionist regions, many of which are powerful and organized. Moreover, some of these regions could attract strong foreign support - a situation the West could use to destabilize Russia or get Moscow involved in another set of wars within its own territory.

The Kremlin has worked very hard in the past few years to clamp down on the most volatile places, like Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, but there is always the possibility that these regions could flare up again very quickly.